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EXPRESSING RULES
abstract
The notion of conceptual normativity is grounded on the idea that our conceptual contents are 
established by the norms of the discursive social practices we engage in. This idea involves two major 
problems. First, where do the norms of discursive practices come from and how can the contents that 
they establish be objective? Second, what is the role of the vocabulary that we use to express such norms 
as explicit rules? This article draws the outline of an account that could possibly answer both questions. 
First, it explores the viability of a naturalism about conceptual normativity. Second, it defines the 
characters of a rational expressivist analysis of the language of the rules.
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A very well-trodden tradition in the analytic philosophy, originated from Wittgenstein’s 
reflections on language games and rule-following in the 1930s, maintains that conceptual 
contents are characterized by normative significance and that our grasp of them is to be 
understood in terms of our ability to engage in norm-governed social practices. Some years 
later, Sellars (1956) beautifully distilled the gist of this approach to rationality into the 
notion of a conceptually articulated and socially maintained space of reasons, where linguistic 
performances provide and are in need of justifications. 
In effect, Wittgenstein’s original focus on rules was part of an argumentative strategy aiming 
to undermine the venerable semantic view according to which an expression is contentful 
only in so far as it contributes to express representations of things in the world. Of course 
his criticism was directed primarily against the authors who had adopted such a view in 
the logical analysis of language, like Frege, Russell and the author of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus himself. The scope of his arguments, however, is crucially wider than linguistic 
analysis. On the one hand, by tackling the assumption that an explanation of conceptual 
contents primarily consists in the definition of homomorphic relations between linguistic 
expressions (or the mental episodes that they express) and states of affairs, he put into 
question the semantic grounds of the traditional accounts of empirical knowledge. On the 
other hand, by suggesting that linguistic practices are what confers contentful states to those 
who engage in them, he also undercut any meta-stance from which to judge the adequacy 
of conceptual contents. As Rorty (1979) pointed out, in this way he issued the challenge 
of rethinking the role not only of the epistemological, but also of any metaphysical and, 
in general, metalinguistic vocabulary that we use. In what follows, I argue that in order 
to really vindicate the objective notion of conceptual contents as they are articulated in a 
naturalistically construed space of reasons, metavocabularies must be reconsidered from an 
expressivist point of view.
The target of Wittgenstein’s criticism can be identified as the view that the semantic 
metavocabulary of representationalism should play a privileged role in the articulation of 
conceptual contents. His focus on the plurality of language games questions such a privilege 
on many levels. The idea of the normativity of meaning that permeates the Philosophical 
Investigations is not simply the idea that the ways in which we use the expressions of a 
language are governed by rules. Rather, it is the idea that the conditions of correctness that 
govern the application of the conceptual contents (which are variously expressed in language 
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uses) are established by the complex pragmatic engagement with our environment that we 
undertake in our discursive practices or forms of life. 
Of course, under this reading, Wittgenstein’s approach puts a huge theoretical load on 
the analysis of the metavocabularies that we use to talk about the norms of our discursive 
practices. This burden has been variously described in the vast literature on rule-following 
that has been thriving with varying vigour since 1953. It is still worth rehearsing here its 
main characters, because they offer a very effective way to single out the problems that we 
are going to deal with. Thus, following McDowell (1984), we can say that the Philosophical 
Investigations should be read as presenting us with a dilemma. 
The one horn consists in the view that norms are some kind of Fregean content that we 
just somehow grasp when we understand the rules of a discursive practice. In this picture, 
grasping a rule is like opening a mental eye on a Platonic object that exhaustively determines 
the criteria for the normative assessment of any performance that is governed by the rule. 
Wittgenstein counters this mythology by suggesting to look at the process of language 
learning, where it is clear that no appeal to any mental awareness of any normative content 
can non-circularily bridge the gap between merely regular verbal behavior and rule-governed 
linguistic one. This means, of course, that one is not allowed to postulate semantic super-facts 
to be represented by such contents.1 But the real reason why this metaphysical approach 
will not work, as Sellars (1954) noticed straight away, is that, if we accept the normative 
characterization of conceptual contents that Wittgenstein advocates, then the very awareness 
of the norms must be understood as positions in the space of reasons. In other words, the 
problem is that the language of the rules is not pragmatically and thus not even semantically 
autonomous from the discursive practices whose norms it talks about. 
The other horn of Wittgenstein’s dilemma is a metalinguistic account of the language of the 
rules. According to such an account, a distinction must always be drawn between the object 
language that is used in a practice and the metalanguage that expresses the norms for its use. 
So that, in order for one to be treated as able to contentfully deploy the former, one must 
already be able to contentfully deploy the latter. In this account, norms are conceived as 
linguistic objects: as such, however, they are in need for an interpretation that can only be 
provided in a metalanguage. Of course, the problem with this approach is that it engenders 
the vicious regress famously described in §201 of the Philosophical Investigations. The conclusion 
to be drawn is that semantic metalanguages are not suitable to express the pragmatic 
significances that are established by the rules of discursive practices. 
As it is well known, Wittgenstein’s solution to slip between the horns of the dilemma 
is to acknowledge that “there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation” 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, §201), not to try to look beneath the bedrock of linguistic justifications 
(§217), and accept forms of life as the primitive given in the analysis of rationality (§247; pt. 
II, p. 226). In other words, he proposes to acknowledge that there is no position outside 
discursive practices where to evaluate them from, since the very possibility to provide any 
normative assessment is grounded on the discursive practices themselves. Unfortunately, 
this proposal raised more problems than it was supposed to solve. On the one hand, there are 
those who have substantially embraced Wittgenstein’s maxim and tried to develop holistic 
accounts in which conceptual contents are determined exclusively in relation the one with the 
other. These authors, like Rorty or Brandom, have been accused of severing the connection 
between conceptual contents and the objective reality and to deliver a picture of the space of 
reasons as a wheel spinning in the void. On the other hand, there are those who have rejected 
1  To this extent, of course, Kripke (1982) was right.
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a demarcational interpretation of the bedrock and have followed instead the idea that our 
discursive practices are supported by causally established patterns of regular behavior, arising 
as a consequence of the responsive abilities to cope with the environment which we are 
endowed with by nature or education. The problem with the latter idea is that no matter how 
much complex a story can be told about our responsiveness to the environment, any piece 
of regular behavior that it establishes will always agree with more than a rule, so it will not 
ever suffice by itself to fully support the normativity of conceptual contents. A paradigmatic 
example of this problem are the hurdles encountered by the various forms of causal, 
informational or teleological semantics.
The reason why Wittgenstein’s path appears to be so unsatisfactory is that it is hard to happily 
accept to stand on the bedrock of the space of reasons while candidly being in the dark on 
what really supports it. In fact it is reasonable to acknowledge, with Davidson (1986), that 
there are no justifications for our beliefs from outside the space of reasons and yet require an 
explanation of what grounds the objectivity of our conceptual contents.
In order to vindicate realism within the space of reasons, the image of the bedrock must be 
acknowledged as a way to picture a categorial distinction that already in nature separates 
rational from non-rational beings, in so far as our ability to play the game of giving and asking 
for reasons is just the way in which our interactions with our environment are articulated. 
That does not mean, however, that philosophers should be content with the acknowledgment 
of such an ability as a “second nature” of ours, like McDowell (1994) suggests. Authors like 
Rouse believe that the task of contemporary naturalism is precisely to accommodate the social 
and normative grasp that we have on the world within scientific understanding: 
The primary phenomenon to understand naturalistically is not the content, 
justification, and truth of beliefs but instead the opening and sustaining of a “space of 
reasons” in which there could be conceptually articulated meaning and justification at 
all, including meaningful disagreement and conceptual difference (Rouse, 2015, p. 17).
There are, however, different ways to think of this task, because there are different ways to 
conceive our conceptual understanding. Rouse efficaciously distinguishes between considering 
it in terms of operative processes in cognition as opposed to normative statuses within 
discursive practices. 
The first of these approaches has been certainly the more common one in cognitive sciences. 
It was championed, for instance, by Fodor (1998), who maintained that a scientific account 
of conceptual contents should explain how mental representations play certain causal roles 
in the mental life of an organism. In this approach, concept application is considered as a 
genus of the more general species of internal processes. Since non-conceptual processes 
pose less problems to scientific explanation, the task of naturalism is conceived as that of 
accounting for how conceptual processes arise beside or even from the other ones. So, this 
approach usually turns down the account of the normativity of conceptual contents. Things 
however do not really change in operative-process accounts that use biological evolution to 
support a normative analysis of an organism’s responses to its environment. So, for instance, 
teleosemantics typically tries to explain the normative character of representational content 
in terms of the notions of indication and biological function: the intentional content that 
determines the correctness of the internal process of an organism as a representation should 
be what in the environment of the organism such a process has been naturally selected 
to causally covary with in a reliable way. However, the notion of biological function can 
account for error only by presupposing an independent determination of the trait types 
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that undergo natural selection (cf. Haugeland, 1998; Nanay, 2010). Consider for example the 
following analysis: an organism’s syncopated heartbeat is a malfunction because the hearts 
of the organism’s ancestors have contributed to their fitness by pumping blood regularly 
into their veins. The problem is whether it is possible to tell what a heart is, in the first place, 
without calling on teleological notions in turn. Likewise, a story can be told about how certain 
processes of an organism acquire the biological function to indicate distal targets. Yet, such 
a story presupposes that the proximal features of the environment, which the organism is 
evolutionarily attuned to, are already (not merely causally but) normatively related to distal 
substances.2
The normative-status approach, by contrast, focuses directly on the normative accountability 
of the behavior of an organism. As Rouse explains, in this approach “[c]onceptual 
understanding [...] need not be identified with any present component of the exercise of 
[practical-perceptual] skills as an operative process” (Rouse, 2015, p. 49). The idea behind 
this approach is to develop a naturalistic account that integrates both the social and the 
biological dimension of cognition. This is however a far less trodden path in cognitive sciences. 
Therefore, for the time being, it is wise for a philosopher to be content just with sketching 
what the outline of such a naturalist account of conceptual normativity should look like. In 
this brief space, I will only wave my hands in the direction of the work of Tomasello (2014). 
He has long maintained that human thinking is essentially cooperative. He has more recently 
argued that what philosophers of action call “shared intentionality”, i.e. the ability that we 
have to engage in social practices with joint goals, joint intentions and mutual knowledge, 
is fundamental to our specific way to produce mental representations, drawing inferences 
and evaluate our own behavior. He believes that the origins of shared intentionality can be 
explained as the result of both a social selective pressure on the collaborative skills required 
for the collaborative activities that individuals could not perform by themselves and the 
diachronic transmission of those skills to the future generations through teaching and social 
norm enforcement. Although this is inevitably promissory-notish, it is still enough to envisage 
the path for a non-reductionist naturalism about the normative statuses that we acquire in 
our discursive practices. First, such an naturalist account must explain how forms of shared 
intentionality emerged, in the light of natural and cultural evolution. Second, it must explain 
how shared intentionality can support the peculiar discursive articulation of our conceptual 
understanding. This sort of naturalism should suggest to the philosopher an answer to the 
question about the origins of the norms and support the idea that the burden of realism is 
not to be carried by the homomorphisms between our judgments and the world, but by the 
normative articulation of our conceptual abilities to cope with the world.
When Sellars (1954) discussed the problem of rule-following, he shared Wittgenstein’s view that 
the dilemma between the idea that rules require meta-linguistic interpretation to be followed 
and the idea that there are only regularities is a false dichotomy. He pointed to the fact that 
there is a sense in which an agent can be said to act in reason of the rules even if he or she has 
no intention whatsoever with respect to the content of the rules. This is the sense in which 
the worker bees, for instance, perform their waggle dance in accord to a certain pattern so to 
represent the position of the food, or children use linguistic expressions in accord to the pattern 
that their caregivers teach them to conform to. These pattern-governed sorts of behavior are not 
merely accidentally in accord with a rule. Sellars’ pragmatist insight is that both are the result 
2  Many of the arguments against teleosemantics, starting from Pietroski’s (1992), can be read as underscoring this 
point.
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of a selective pressure that makes them subject to normative assessment: in the first case the 
selective pressure is exerted by natural evolution, in the second by cultural learning. 
At the time, however, Sellars adopted a non-cognitivist framework for the analysis of learning 
processes that tends to obfuscate another important point of his. In fact, while the explanation 
of the development of the waggle dance only requires the analysis of the attunement of the 
bees’ internal processes with their environment, the cultural learning of linguistic behavior 
can only be explained in the context of already up and running social discursive practices. 
Suppose that a naturalistic account like the one envisaged in the previous section is available 
to explain the origins of these practices. Still, the problem remains of understanding the gap 
that a child, who has been initiated to the space of reasons, has to fill in order to eventually be 
considered a full-blown discursive practitioner. According to Sellars the gap is an expressivist 
one: the child has to learn the language of the rules. 
In order to grasp this idea, it is important to clarify what a language of the rules for a 
discursive practice is. Such a language must contain the expressive resources to make explicit 
the pragmatic significance of the expressions of the language that is used in the practice. In 
this sense it certainly is a metalanguage. Usually, the sort of metalanguages we are familiar 
with are semantic ones. So, for instance, in the Tarskian approach of model-theoretic 
semantics, metalanguages are deployed to refer to the expressions of the object languages 
and to associate them with their extensions in some structure of interpretation. The language 
of the rules, instead, must contain the normative vocabulary to say that certain linguistic 
moves are permitted or obligatory. As Brandom (2008) put it, such a language is a pragmatic 
metavocabulary: it allows to say what one does when one meaningfully deploys a certain 
vocabulary in a certain practice. 
The sense in which the expressive resources of a pragmatic metavocabulary make a difference 
with respect to conceptual understanding depends on the very articulation of the space of 
reasons. By making moves in the game of giving and asking for reasons speakers endorse 
entitlements and commitments to further moves. What is a reason for what depends on 
which moves are treated as correct. So, for instance, if the move from p to q is treated as 
correct, then p can be given as a reason for q. Now, pragmatic metalanguages just allow to 
say that a move is treated as correct. By way of illustration consider logical vocabularies and 
in particular the case of conditionals. The conditional “p → q” allows to say something that 
could be otherwise only done by treating the inference from p to q as correct. The assertion of 
a conditional, in turn, is itself a move in the discursive practice, that can be given as a reason 
(for instance to argue by modus ponens from p to q) and for which reasons can be asked. In this 
sense, pragmatic metavocabularies bring into the game of giving and asking for reasons the 
very norms that regulate it. They provide discursive practices with the expressive resources 
that allow in principle to question any normative attitude: they illustrate why any privileged 
(either subjective or intersubjective) perspective in the game of giving and asking for reasons 
is structurally impossible.
The language of the rules for a discursive practice, then, is a pragmatic metavocabulary that 
allows to make explicit what ought to be the case and what ought to be done. Those who 
manage the language of rules are able to make assertions about the norms of the practice. 
Thus they are able to justify the others’ and their own behavior in the light of those norms. 
Besides, they can also challenge those norms and develop the conceptual articulation of the 
contents that depend on them. This, in effect, is what makes of them full-blown discursive 
practitioners. By learning pragmatic metavocabularies, however, they do not gain access to 
any meta-stance: the authority of the assertions in the pragmatic metavocabularies is not 
grounded “from sideways on” (McDowell 1994), but on the normative interaction with the 
world that we engage in in the space of reasons.
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In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein challenged the standard representational 
approach in semantics in two fundamental senses. First, he argued that the content of 
linguistic expressions is to be explained in terms of the norms of the discursive practices 
in which they are used. Second, he impugned the metavocabulary that is used for semantic 
analysis. Any account of conceptual normativity that follows such a pragmatist approach, 
then, must face the problem of vindicating the objectivity of conceptual contents and the 
possibility to talk about them. My modest purpose here was just to describe a strategy to do 
that in terms of a naturalistic account of conceptual normativity and a rational expressivist 
analysis of the language of rules. I can be satisfied if the shape of such a strategy has been 
enough clarified.
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